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Abstract
This article analyzes Mencius 7B.23, a concise passage that offers complex 
ethical dilemmas. It provides a close reading of the passage, along with 
relevant passages elsewhere in the text and, occasionally, in other texts. The 
narrow goal of the article is to present a coherent reading of the passage 
within the context of the Mencius as a whole. This reading suggests that 
while the passage touches upon a wide range of topics, including personal 
credibility and political responsibility, the overarching concern is on being 
a morally superior person, on the difficult dilemmas such people may 
face, and on how they would respond to them. More broadly, the article 
shows that while the philosophical practice of “weighing circumstances” 
(quan 權) allows moral agents in exceptional cases to break certain moral 
or ritual rules, Mencius seems unwilling to apply this discretion when 
morality as a whole, or the integrity of the person who embodies it (shi 士), 
are involved.
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The Mencius 孟子 is a revered Chinese philosophical text. Scholars 
readily admit to deriving “pleasure from Mencius as a work of litera-
ture,” as they place its supposed author, Mencius, on a pedestal as 
one who “besides being one of the greatest thinkers, happens to be 
one of the greatest stylists in the whole history of Chinese literature” 
(Dobson 1963, vii; Lau 1970, 222). The work is indeed both insightful 
and delightful, but it also contains passages that are hard to grasp, 
especially on a first read, because they do not “provide transparent 
information about the philosophical position he holds” (Geisz 2007, 
190). This article analyzes one of those passages:
Qi was struck by famine. Chen Zhen said, “The people in the state all 
think that you, Master, will [make a plea to] distribute [from] the Tang 
for them again, but I apprehend you cannot do so again.” Mencius 
said, “That would be to act like Feng Fu. Among the inhabitants of 
Jin there was a certain Feng Fu, who was great at catching tigers. 
Ultimately, he became a great gentleman. Thereupon he [once] went 
to the countryside. There was a crowd in pursuit of a tiger. The tiger 
had its back to a crag, but no one dared to attack it. Seeing Feng Fu 
in the distance, they rushed to welcome him. Feng Fu rolled up his 
sleeves and alighted from the carriage. The whole crowd was pleased 
with him, but those who were gentlemen laughed at him.”1
This passage raises many questions. For example: Who is Chen 
Zhen? What is the Tang? Did Feng Fu subdue the tiger in the end? 
Why would gentlemen laugh at him? How does Mencius judge their 
laughter? If he disapproves, does he consider them snobs who shy 
away from rolling up their sleeves to help others? In that case, why 
would he call them gentlemen? If he approves, does he applaud 
laughing at people who lend a helping hand? In that case, would 
he recommend not helping others? If so, does a relatively minor 
1 Mencius 7B.23: 齊饑. 陳臻曰, “國人皆以夫子將復為發棠, 殆不可復.” 孟子曰, “是為馮婦也. 晉人有 馮婦者, 善
搏虎. 卒為善士. 則之野, 有眾逐虎. 虎負嵎, 莫之敢攖. 望見馮婦, 趨而迎之. 馮婦攘臂下車. 眾皆悅之, 其為士者
笑之.” Translations in this article are my own. Translations from the Mencius are based 
on the Mengzi zhushu 孟子注疏 edition (cf. Zhao 2000). My translation of 7B.23 sticks 
close to the source text to facilitate discussion of textual issues (see below).
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personal inconvenience, such as becoming a laughingstock, in his 
view outweigh the life-threatening tribulations of the multitudes? In 
short, what is the meaning of this passage?
The passage’s perplexity explains its relative obscurity. Over-
views of Chinese philosophy do not use it to illustrate Mencius’s 
thought, and Mencius studies likewise tend to prefer interpretively 
more accessible examples from the text. Even translators treat the 
passage with underwhelming enthusiasm. For instance, Lionel Giles 
does not include it in his abridged Mencius translation (Giles 1942, 
122). Others do include it, but either without explanatory comments 
(Couvreur 1895, 639–640; Ware 1960, 160; Lau 1970, 198), or with a 
few textual notes at best (Lyall 1932, 232; Dobson 1963, 50–51; Lévy 
[2003] 2008, 196). Some translators do touch on the meaning of the 
passage, but their encapsulations differ widely. Richard Wilhelm 
prefaces his translation of the passage with the Latin adage tempora 
mutantur (times are changed), which suggests that to him its import 
is that different times call for different approaches ([1916] 1921, 177). 
James Legge and Ernst Faber both speak of “dignity” when they put 
the passage in a nutshell (Legge [1861] 1991, 488n23; Faber 1882, 
121). Irene Bloom calls it “a matter of credibility,” and Robert Eno 
sees it as an example of Mencius “tempering righteous action with 
pragmatism” (Bloom 2009, 161; Eno 2016, 156). Bryan W. Van Norden 
focuses on yet another aspect of the text, when he comments: “What 
is appropriate for a person to do depends upon his social role.” (2008, 
189). The passage has been discussed by a few Chinese scholars, past 
and present. The discussions tend to be brief (one barely covers half 
a journal-page) and limited to one textual issue (discussed below). 
In English academic literature, the passage is used as an example 
by Sungmoon Kim (who aptly calls it a “largely unattended episode” 
in the Mencius) in his essay on political responsibility; by Myeong-
seok Kim in his research into the sources of moral motivation in the 
Mencius; by Michael LaFargue in his portrayal of the sociohistorical 
background of a Chinese philosophical text; and by Robert Eno who, 
in his article on Mencian casuistry, synopsizes the passage in just 
one sentence (S. Kim 2010, 37–38; M. Kim 2014, 67; 2018, 74; LaFargue 
1994, 89–90; Eno 2002, 197–198). In short, while scholarly attention is 
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not wholly absent, treatment of the passage tends to be brief, limited, 
and highly divergent. 
In my view, the Mencius passage merits an in-depth study, as it is 
more insightful than a cursory reading suggests. A fuller understanding 
requires background knowledge, careful scrutiny, and a receptivity to 
this mode of expressing philosophical views. As Paul R. Goldin points 
out (2017, 55): “Chinese philosophy tends to demand a high level of 
interpretive participation from its audience.” This article “participates” 
through a close reading of the passage, supplemented by relevant 
passages elsewhere in the text and, occasionally, in other texts. This 
methodology follows the example of scholars such as David S. Nivison 
who pays meticulous attention to particular passages, phrases, 
and even words while never assuming that he understands their 
meaning (Van Norden 1996, 4–5). Accordingly, Nivison’s methodology 
involves reading relevant commentaries and translations, looking 
for glosses of words and paraphrases of key phrases, and preferring 
interpretations that attribute a sensible meaning to the text and cohere 
with the larger context. This is a slow method, as it involves pondering 
over seemingly insignificant issues such as the importance of the 
common word “again” (fu 復). As a consequence, this article may be a 
slow read at first, but a well-grounded interpretation of the passage 
has major implications, insufficiently brought out by earlier studies, 
as it reveals ethical dilemmas of considerable gravity, as well as 
Mencius’s treatment thereof. The dilemmas will be discussed in the 
latter part of this study (Sections 4–5), a discussion for which the 
former part (Sections 1–3) lays the groundwork. 
The main goal of this article is modest: to provide a coherent 
reading of the passage within the context of the Mencius as a whole. 
This reading suggests that while the passage touches upon several 
topics, including personal dignity and political responsibility, the 
overarching concern is on being a morally superior person, on 
the difficult dilemmas such people may face, and on how they 
would respond to them. More broadly, the article shows that while 
the philosophical practice of “weighing circumstances” (quan 權) 
allows moral agents in exceptional cases to break certain moral or 
ritual rules, Mencius seems unwilling to apply this discretion when 
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morality as a whole, or the integrity of the person who embodies it 
(shi 士), are involved.
I. Close Reading
This section offers a textual analysis of the Mencius passage translated 
above. It addresses the narrative structure, sentence segmentation, 
and several key terms.
A. Narrative Structure
The translated passage is 7B.23, a section located roughly in the 
middle of the final chapter in the Mencius. The enclosing sections 
focus on other topics (7B.22 on the music of sage-kings, 7B.24 on 
destiny), thereby demarcating our section as a self-contained unit of 
text. Hence, a proper understanding of 7B.23 depends primarily on this 
textual unit itself.
The narrative structure of 7B.23 consists of an outer story and an 
inner story. The outer story, or frame narrative, is a simple dialogue 
(one question, one answer) about a famine. The inner story is an 
anecdote about a tiger. Importantly, the outer story does not fully 
envelop the inner story. The dialogue’s answer relays the anecdote 
but does not continue afterwards. As a result, the final sentence of the 
textual unit as a whole concludes both stories, inner and outer. This 
leaves it to readers to contemplate how a tiger relates to a famine, 
and how both relate to the philosophy of the text that contains this 
nested narrative. 
The format of the outer story is common in early Chinese philo-
so phical texts, which attribute statements to so-called “masters” (here 
Master Meng, or Mencius), and those statements can be preceded by 
questions from others (such as rulers, pupils, and rivals). The format 
of the inner story is also conventional. It conforms neatly to the 
characteristic features of anecdotes in early Chinese philosophical 
texts, as described by Van Els and Queen (2017, 7–24). Accordingly, the 
inner story is short (44 characters), has one main protagonist (the tiger 
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catcher), and three discernible narrative components: a beginning, 
which provides the background  (“among the inhabitants. . .”); a middle 
part, which tells the incident (“went to the countryside. . .”); and an 
ending, which reveals the consequence (“the whole crowd. . .”). The 
ending of anecdotes in general tends to be a punchline whose value 
lies, for example, in the “inculcation of a moral lesson” (Fadiman 
1985, xvi). In this case the moral of the story is not instantly clear, 
as Mencius does not elaborate on the anecdote. Fortunately, we can 
gain clarity by continuing our close reading of the passage, which 
will ultimately suggest that his opacity might be intentional.
B. Sentence Segmentation
The text of 7B.23 is generally agreed upon, except for this string 
of characters: 卒為善士則之野有眾逐虎. The lack of punctuation in the 
original text tasks readers with the parsing of the string to create 
meaningful phrases. Three readings have been proposed:
(1)	 卒為善士. 則之野. 有眾逐虎.	
(2)	 卒為善. 士則之. 野有眾逐虎.	
(3)	 卒為善士則. 之野. 有眾逐虎.	
In translation:
(1) Ultimately, he became a great gentleman. 
 Thereupon he went to the countryside. 
 There was a crowd in pursuit of a tiger.
(2) Ultimately, he became great. 
 Gentlemen took him as a model. 
 In the countryside there was a crowd in pursuit of a tiger.
(3) Ultimately, he became a model for great gentlemen. 
 He went to the countryside. 
 There was a crowd in pursuit of a tiger.
Option (1) is the oldest and most prevalent reading to date. This 
is how Zhao Qi 趙岐 (d. 201), Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), Jiao Xun 焦循 
(1763–1820), and others read the text (Zhao 2000, 462; Zhu 1983, 369; 
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Jiao 1987, 988–989). Option (2) was proposed by Liu Changshi 劉昌
詩 (13th c.) and his younger contemporary Zhou Mi 周密 (1232–1298). 
It never gained wide currency, but at least one present-day scholar, 
Cui Aofei, favors this reading (Liu 1983, 507; Zhou 1984, 232; Cui 2012, 
41). Option (3) was proposed recently in two separate publi cations: 
an article by Wang Changlin, and a brief research note by Qin Hualin 
and Ling Yu (Wang 2002, 64; Qin and Ling 2005, 31). 
The different readings are facilitated by the ambiguity of Classical 
Chinese, in which words can have different semantic meanings 
and grammatical functions. In this case, ze 則 can be a conjunction 
indicating a temporal relation between phrases (here translated as 
“thereupon”) and a verb meaning “to imitate” (here translated as “to 
take as a model”); wei 為 can be a copula verb (“he became. . .”) and a 
passive marker (“he was taken. . .”); and zhi 之 can be a verb of motion 
(“he went to. . .”) and an object pronoun (“took him as a model”). In 
view of the many possibilities, how to determine what reading is 
best? We can start by recognizing that while the string of characters 
is problematic, the proposed solutions are not flawless either. 
Option (1) reads ze as introducing a singular event (the outing to 
the countryside), even though it “typically refers to situations and 
expectations that reflect general patterns” (Kroll 2015, 586).
Option (2) separates shan 善 “great” from shi 士 “gentleman” 
and associates each with a different sentence (“. . . became great. 
Gentlemen took. . .”). However, the combination shanshi 善士 “great 
gentleman” occurs eight more times in the Mencius (once in 3B.6 
and seven times in 5B.8) and is clearly a special term in the text (cf. 
LaFargue 1994, 58). Moreover, this reading does not specify how the 
protagonist became great, which is strange because the preceding 
sentence in the anecdote already declares that he was great at catching 
tigers. Finally, as Yan Ruoju 閻若璩 (1636–1704) points out, having 
“gentlemen took him as a model” immediately followed by “in the 
countryside there was a crowd . . .” introduces a narrative gap by not 
expressing that the protagonist made a trip to the countryside (Yan 
1983, 391). 
Option (3) suggests that the protagonist was taken as a model 
by great gentlemen because he was great at catching tigers, in which 
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case the ending of the anecdote, where gentlemen laugh at him for 
engaging in catching a tiger, makes little sense. 
With each reading being somehow flawed, “in the end it is dif-
ficult to decide which side is correct” 很難決定究竟是那一面對, as Lu 
Xun (1881–1936) remarks with regard to this anecdote ([1934] 1963, 
461). While it is admittedly difficult, there is a significant difference 
between the traditional reading (option 1) and the later proposals 
(options 2 and 3). The latter parse the text in ways that vitiate the 
narrative, but the former merely involves a lexical peculiarity, as ze 
rarely introduces specific events. Not only is this less problematic, 
but the particular usage of ze possibly even strengthens the narra-
tive. The conjunction suggests a logical connection between two 
sentences. Specifically, it suggests that the protagonist went to the 
country as a gentleman, that is, after he had become one. The Mencius 
translation by Dobson expresses this most clearly: “Traveling in the 
countryside in this latter capacity he found the inhabitants pursuing a 
tiger.” (1963, 51, emphasis added).
C. Key Terms
The frame narrative opens with a statement about a famine in Qi 
齊. This powerful state was something of a mecca for Mencius, who 
hailed from a nearby statelet. On several occasions he confabulated 
with King Xuan of Qi 齊宣王 (r. 319–301 BCE), and his political career 
included a brief stint as a minister of the state (Mencius 2B.6). In his 
world, famine in Qi was big news. 
In the text, Mencius is asked about the famine by a certain Chen 
Zhen 陳臻. This person is known only from the Mencius. He occurs 
in one more passage, in which he also asks a question, leading Zhao 
Qi to call him a student of Mencius (Mencius 2B.3; Zhao 2000, 129). 
Two further passages mention a certain Chenzi 陳子, which possibly 
translates as “Master Chen,” whom Zhao Qi considers to be the same 
person (Mencius 2B.10, 6B.14; Zhao 2000, 143). Scholars commonly 
follow the commentator in seeing Chen Zhen, a.k.a. Chenzi, as a 
pupil of Mencius. “This is all that is known of him,” concludes Legge 
([1861] 1991, 215). However, the various apparitions of Chen Zhen in 
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the Mencius offer two relevant insights. 
(1) Three out of four passages involving Chen Zhen mention 
Qi. One passage discusses Mencius’s resignation from office in 
that state, from which Dobson logically concludes that the student 
was with him towards the close of his tenure in Qi (Mencius 2B.10; 
Dobson 1963, 91–92). Following the resignation, the king wanted to 
keep Mencius in Qi by offering him a residence and a stipend. He 
conveyed the offer to a certain Shizi 時子, who relayed it to Chenzi, 
who told Mencius. This suggests that Chenzi was an associate of 
Mencius with ties to government circles in Qi. That he would ask 
about the famine in that state is understandable. 
(2) All four passages involving Chen Zhen address the relation-
ship between rulers and advisors, and highlight the latter’s integrity 
and incorruptibility. In one passage, Mencius informs Chenzi that 
exemplary people refuse to serve rulers who do not treat them with 
proper respect, and who have no intention of implementing their 
advice (Mencius 6B.14). This is also a main theme in the passage 
about the famine in Qi, as we shall see. 
Chen Zhen’s question about the famine includes the words fa 
tang 發棠. The first word, fa, has a plethora of meanings. Here it is 
a verb meaning ‘to distribute,’ which specifically refers to issuing 
food to the hungry. As Yang Bojun (1909–1992) points out, the same 
usage of the word is found in the opening chapter of the text, where 
Mencius accuses a king of dereliction of duty, for the king “does not 
know to distribute” 不知發 food even when starved corpses fill the 
roads (Mencius 1A.3; Yang [1960] 1988, 333). The second word, tang, 
is obscure. It does not occur elsewhere in the Mencius. Zhao Qi notes 
that Tang was a town in Qi, which scholars have since identified 
as present-day Jimo 即墨 in Shandong 山東 province. In Mencius’s 
time, this was apparently where Qi kept grain in store. Hence, the 
two words combined refer to the distribution of grain from the state 
granaries. 
In his question, Chen Zhen uses the word “again” (fu 復), thereby 
alluding to an earlier famine in Qi, during which Mencius had ap-
parently made a plea to open the state granaries for the relief of 
starvelings. While the earlier plea is not recorded in the transmitted 
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Mencius, famine is a recurring theme in the book. For example, 
Mencius tells the governing officer of Pinglu 平陸, a town in the 
western part of Qi: “In years of famine and starvation, the old and 
frail among your people fell dead in the ditches, while the able-
bodied fled by the thousands in all directions.”2 He also speaks 
with the ruler of Liang 梁 about famine in that state  (Mencius 1A.3), 
and he avers that just like “years of scarcity cannot kill those who 
stockpile victuals, times of depravity cannot corrupt those who 
stockpile virtue.”3 Famine is clearly an important concern for Mencius. 
Whether or not there actually was an earlier occasion in which he 
pleaded with the ruler of Qi to open the state granaries is irrelevant, 
because the text makes it believable that he did. Hence, the main 
value of Chen Zhen’s use of the word “again” is not his torical but 
philosophical, as repetition of action is a main theme in this Mencius 
passage. 
Chen Zhen suggests that Mencius would not repeat his plea now 
that Qi is facing famine again. Mencius does not expressly agree, 
but merely notes that doing so would be to act like Feng Fu 馮婦. 
This person is virtually unknown in ancient Chinese literature. Even 
his name is remarkable. Feng 馮 is a common surname, but Fu 婦 
means “woman.” Commentators hasten to explain that Feng Fu is not 
a woman surnamed Feng, but a man with the given name Fu. That 
Mencius feels the need to introduce this man (“among the inhabitants 
of Jin. . .”) suggests that Feng Fu was unrenowned. It is even possible 
that Mencius made him up. After all, Fung Fu’s native state of Jin was 
located several hundred miles from Mencius’s main area of activity, 
which conveniently complicates verification of the story. Hence, the 
opening line of the anecdote could be read as “somewhere far away 
there was someone who. . .” with the specific details merely adding a 
coating of credibility. Still, even if Feng Fu is a fictional character, this 
would make no difference for the meaning of the passage, which is 
not about historical accuracy, but about conveying a philosophical 
message through the medium of an anecdote.
2 Mencius 2B.4: 凶年饑歲, 子之民, 老羸轉於溝壑, 壯者散而之四方者, 幾千人矣.
3 Mencius 7B.10: 周于利者凶年不能殺, 周于德者邪世不能亂.
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II. Tiger Catcher
The anecdote told by Mencius suggests that Feng Fu as a young man 
excelled at catching tigers, which merits a closer look as this is no 
workaday occupation. Of the various words for hunting and catching 
animals in Classical Chinese, Mencius here uses bo 搏. The written 
form contains the stylized image of a hand, 扌, as a semantic element. 
The spoken form, now bo, in ancient times was closer to pak, which is 
possibly the onomatopoeic representation of a punch or a blow from 
the fist.4 If the latter conjecture is correct, the visual and oral forms 
combine to suggest a violent action involving hands. This coheres 
with the word’s usage elsewhere in the Mencius. In the famed debate 
on human nature, Mencius says of water that “by striking it you can 
make it splash up above your forehead”5 In another dialogue he 
speaks of someone being “held down and detained” 搏執 (Mencius 
4B.3). Both cases involve physical contact between the hands and an 
external object upon which they apply force, whether by splashing 
up water or holding down a person. The story of Feng Fu similarly 
involves physical contact between him and tigers, whom he fights 
and pins down with his bare hands. These fights require athletic 
ability, dexterity, and above all intrepidity. They are spectacular 
displays of his closeness to nature, both literally and figuratively. 
This is man at his most primitive; his animal nature comes fully to 
the fore. In the traditional Chinese dichotomy between “civility” (wen 
文) and “martiality” (wu 武), the tiger fighter perfectly embodies the 
latter value.
When Mencius introduces Feng Fu as a tiger fighter, he mentions 
an extraordinary but no imaginary occupation. Animal fights of 
this kind were more common in ancient China than today. In those 
days, as Mark E. Lewis observes, the Chinese “battled animals hand-
to-hand as displays of courage during hunts” (Lewis 1989, 154). An 
apposite example is an Ode 詩 titled “Senior Younger Brother in the 
[Hunting] Fields” 大叔於田 (Maoshi zhengyi 4.2; cf. Mao 2000, 333), 
4 Baxter and Sagart (2014) reconstruct this word in Old Chinese as *p ak. 
5 Mencius 6A.2: 搏而躍之可使過顙.
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which contains these lines:
You bare your chest for the apprehension 襢裼暴虎
of a tiger to present to the lord’s mansion. 獻於公所
Oh, younger brother, don’t be reckless, 將叔無狃
beware or you’ll sustain a laceration. 戒其傷女6
The Ode’s portrayal of the younger brother baring his chest is re-
miniscent of Mencius’s remark that Feng Fu rolled up his sleeves when 
he alighted from the carriage. Both vestiary actions add colorful detail 
to the narration, and they signal an eagerness to engage in hand-to-
paw combat. These men were not involuntarily thrown to the lions; 
they readily flung themselves at tigers!
Animal combat in ancient China occurred even at the highest 
echelons of society (Lewis 1989, 155). The Ode illustrates this, as 
it tells the story of Duan 段, the younger brother of Lord Zhuang 
of Zheng 鄭莊公 (r. 743–701 BCE). The first two lines depict Duan’s 
intention to present his older brother with a feral gift as an unsubtle 
hint of his fearlessness and strength. In real life, Duan fearlessly led a 
rebellion against his brother in 722 BCE (Zuozuan, Yin 1; cf. Zuo 2000, 
57–62). The last two lines of the Ode warn that his rashness may lead 
to injury, ostensibly by the tiger but possibly by his brother as well. In 
real life, the ruler of Zheng indeed crushed the rebellion.
Animal combat also occurred in the lower strata of society 
where, Lewis notes, the fights “were associated with men prone to 
violence,” such as “wastrel youths [. . .], criminals, and other marginal 
figures” (Lewis 1989, 155). If he ever lived, Feng Fu was probably 
one of those marginal figures, because Mencius introduces him as 
someone “among the inhabitants of Jin,” not as a member of the elite. 
His animalistic skills must have been of great use, because recent 
research shows that tigers roamed over most of China in those days 
(Kang et al. 2010, 337). Hence, there likely was a demand for dauntless 
men who could safeguard society from these ferocious creatures. In 
the literary world of the anecdote, this is reflected by the observation 
6 My translation reflects the rhyme in lines 1, 2, and 4:  in the 
Baxter and Sagart reconstruction.
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that the villagers “rushed to welcome him,” and that “the whole crowd 
was pleased with him.”
Not everyone appreciated men who were that close to nature. 
For example, Confucius 孔子 (551–479 BCE) would not put someone 
who fights tigers in charge of the army, because the commanding 
officer “must be someone who stands in awe of the task that he 
faces, and succeeds due to his predilection for devising strategies.”7 
In Confucius’s view, the very qualities required for wrestling with 
wild animals, such as bravery and celerity, disqualify someone from 
overseeing the troops, which requires reflection and restraint, two 
qualities he clearly ranks higher. Others likewise recognized the 
dangers of martiality, especially when insufficiently accompanied by 
civility. They argued for a balance between the two, or even better, 
as one text puts it, “two measures of civility for each measure of 
martiality” 二文一武 (Huangdi sijing 1.5; cf. Chen 1995, 172). Mencius 
seems to share this sentiment, as he presents a new side of Feng Fu 
that outbalances his animalistic nature.
III. Gentleman
Mencius suggests that Feng Fu later in life became a shi 士. This term 
has several meanings, in the Mencius as well as in general. Absent a 
perfect equivalent in English, it is variously translated as “knight,” 
“scholar,” “official,” “gentleman,” and so on. The latter translation is 
adopted in this article, as it captures some of the versatility of the 
Chinese term. As a prominent cultural concept, shi occurs in many 
ancient texts, and features in several modern studies (e.g., Hsu 1965, 
89–106; Yu 1987, 1–128). However, in order to understand what it 
means specifically for Mencius to call Feng Fu a shi, we must explore 
the meaning of this term in the Mencius, which mentions it over 
ninety times. The following overview is based on my analysis of all 
shi mentions in the Mencius.8
7	 Analects 7.11: 必也臨事而懼, 好謀而成者也.
8 For a comparable analysis, see LaFargue (1994, 69–94), who describes what he calls 
“Shih-Idealists” based on numerous Mencius passages.
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Mencius broadly divides society into four levels (ruler, high 
nobility, low nobility, common people), and he associates shi with 
the third level. While the first two levels held the highest and often 
hereditary offices, shi offered various services to those above them 
(Mencius 3B.4). As men of service, shi barely outranked those below 
them. Mencius even mentions the lowest two social strata in the 
same breath when he speaks of “gentlemen and commoners” 士庶人 
(Mencius 1A.1, 4A.3). He also notes that the starting emolument of a shi 
is comparable to that of a commoner who, when performing a public 
task, had to be compensated for not being able to cultivate the land 
(Mencius 5B.2).
What truly characterizes shi is not their social status or wealth, 
but their mentality. As Mencius puts it, “only gentlemen are capable 
of keeping a stable mind while lacking stable means.”9 They acquire 
this steady mentality through education. He gives the example of 
someone called Chen Liang 陳良, whose excellence in learning earned 
him the appellation “preeminent gentleman” 豪傑之士 (Mencius 3A.4). 
As educated men, shi were the intelligentsia of their time and nearly all 
philosophers, including Mencius, belonged to this social stratum. The 
education of shi was aimed not at erudition, but at moral cultivation. 
For example, Chen Liang is said to have “delighted in the ways of the 
Duke of Zhou and Confucius” 悅周公仲尼之道, two paragons of virtue 
(Mencius 3A.4). As cultivated men, shi observe core values such as 
“humaneness” (ren 仁) and “rightness” (yi 義) (Mencius 7A.33). On the 
latter value, Mencius says:
When impoverished, gentlemen do not lose hold of rightness. When 
accomplished, they do not stray from their path. By not losing hold 
of rightness, even when impoverished, they acquire character. By not 
straying from their path, even when accomplished, the people do not 
lose hope in them.10
As “practitioners of humaneness and rightness” 為仁義者 who “preserve 
the ways of the ancient kings while awaiting those who would learn 
9 Mencius 1A.7: 無恆產而有恆心者惟士為能. 
10 Mencius 7A.9: 士窮不失義, 達不離道. 窮不失義故士得己焉, 達不離道故民不失望焉.
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them” 守先王之道以待後之學者, shi are ideally suited to advise rulers 
(Mencius 3B.4). Similar to farmers, weavers, carpenters, and wheel-
wrights, who provide food, clothes, and other tangible goods, shi 
offer models of proper conduct. It may be difficult to appraise their 
intangible wares, but Mencius maintains that shi should be decently 
remunerated, presumably because of their impact. While other pro-
fes sions improve the livelihood of rulers, shi refine their behavior. 
In Mencius’s ideal world, rulers lead by example and their refined 
behavior permeates through society in what we may call “trickle-down 
morality.” The populace benefits from this, which is presumably why 
Mencius in the quotation above claims that “the people do not lose 
hope” in shi.
As advisors to rulers, shi had a solemn duty to speak truth to 
power. Mencius even claims that a state may perish without “gentle-
men who offer admonishments” 拂士 (Mencius 6B.15). This epithet 
also applies to himself, as evidenced by many episodes in the text. 
Consider the well-known opening passage, where a king cour-
teously welcomes Mencius in hope of enriching his kingdom. 
Mencius instantly asseverates that he only intends to discuss moral 
enrichment (Mencius 1A.1). “Everyone is shocked, reeling from [his] 
audacity in rebuking the king,” in Van Norden’s lively depiction of the 
scene (2011, 84).
When shi endeavor to offer well-intentioned advice to a head 
of state, they may expect that the advice be followed. This did not 
always happen, leading to two unpleasant scenarios:
(1) In the worst case, the advice could invoke the ruler’s wrath 
and lead to the advisor’s untimely death. An example well known 
to Mencius is Bi Gan 比干, whose unappreciated advice led to his 
gruesome end at the behest of Zhòu 紂, the infamous last king of the 
Shang 商 (16th–11th c. BCE) dynasty. In Mencius’s view, such examples 
should not deter shi, because “a strong-minded gentleman never 
forgets that he may end in a ditch, and a stout-hearted gentleman 
never forgets that he may forfeit his head.”11 Speaking for himself, he 
adds: “I am very fond of life, but I am also fond of rightness, and if I 
11 Mencius 3B.1: 志士不忘在溝壑, 勇士不忘喪其元.
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cannot have both, I will give up life and go with rightness.”12 Ivanhoe 
illuminates Mencius’s view: 
virtuous agents who face extreme adversity and risk death are 
fully aware of how bad it is and intensely dislike the prospect. Yet 
despite finding the thought of their own death repulsive, they do 
not turn away from such threats when these stand in the way of 
doing what is right. Ethically good people feel the danger and loathe 
the prospect of dying but are unmoved in their pursuit of the good. 
(Ivanhoe 2006, 230)
As Mencius himself puts it, a shi does what is right, even if it would 
kill him, and avoids what is wrong, even if it would benefit him, 
because “those who bend themselves can never straighten others.” 13
(2) In a not-worst-but-still-bad scenario, the ruler simply ignores 
the advice. In that case, the advisor’s work would be in vain, and he 
dies what I would call a “vocational death,” which for a man devoted 
to service differs little from the physical death of someone whose 
unwanted advice cost him his life. Unappreciated by the ruler, the 
vocationally dead gentleman must seek his employ elsewhere. In 
Mencius’s words, if the person in charge is unworthy, “gentlemen 
keep themselves over a thousand miles away,” and only if he is 
worthy do “gentlemen from all over the world come to him in great 
numbers.”14 
In summation, what does it mean for Mencius to call Feng Fu a 
gentleman? Zhao Qi relates it to Feng Fu’s courage as a tiger fighter 
(Zhao 2000, 462). Being a shi indeed requires a strong dose of courage, 
but it involves much more than that. Mencius generally presents shi 
as exemplary men who are well-educated and well-mannered, who 
have a highly developed sense of dignity and honor, and who—at the 
risk of life if need be—endeavor to do what is right. In other words, 
being a shi is not a logical extension of being a tiger fighter. Rather, it 
12 Mencius 6A.10: 生亦我所欲也, 義亦我所欲也, 二者不可得兼, 舍生而取義者也.
13 Mencius 3B.1: 枉己者未有能直人者也. 
14 Mencius 6B.13: 士止於千里之外; 5A.1: 天下之士多就之.
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involves a radical transformation from a martial temperament to a 
civility-driven mentality.
IV. Laughter
While Mencius presents shi as exemplary men, in the anecdote that he 
tells, they laugh at someone who helps others fight a tiger. This help 
can be seen as an expression of humaneness, which is a core value of 
the shi. Why, then, do they laugh at a man who lends a helping hand?
The answer, in my view, is rooted in Mencius’s understanding of 
human nature. While he is known for the slogan “human nature is 
good” 性善, he actually describes humans in less positive terms. He 
espouses what I would call a scale of sophistication. At the one end, 
there are the uncouth who give free rein to their animal instincts; 
at the other, civilized people who bridle their instincts and behave 
appropriately at all times. The average person does not dwell in 
the center of the scale, as we might expect, but towards the lesser 
end: “humans have a propensity to fill their belly, dress warmly, 
and live comfortably; they are close to birds and beasts, were it not 
for education.”15 In other words, in fulfilling our basic needs we are 
barely distinguishable from animals, and only learning (specifically, 
moral learning) can set us apart. As Roger T. Ames notes: “For 
Mencius, an undeveloped human being—someone who is resolutely 
un educated and uncultured—is not in any important sense ‘human’” 
(Ames 1991, 163).
Mencius famously assumes that all people (even the uncouth) 
possess “sprouts” 端 of moral behavior. Moral growth involves de-
veloping those inner sprouts, which requires dedication, persever ance, 
and above all, patience:
A peasant in Song was disappointed that his seedlings would not 
grow, so he pulled at them. Coming home dead beat, he told his 
family, “What a back-breaking day! I helped the seedlings grow.” 
15 Mencius 3A.4: 人之有道也, 飽食, 煖衣, 逸居而無教則近於禽獸.
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His sons ran out to inspect the seedlings, but they had already 
withered.16
Analogous to growth in nature, progress on the scale of sophistication 
cannot be rushed. It is “a learning process with which we must engage,” 
Xinzhong Yao notes, adding that the process only “gradually leads 
to the realization of our potential” (2018, 195). Ordinary people need 
a role model (parent, teacher, etc.) to guide them in this process and 
encourage them to do right, but shi have successfully learned to 
exhibit proper conduct of their own accord. In Mencius’s own words:
Those who await a King Wen before they bestir themselves are 
average people, whereas preeminent gentlemen bestir themselves 
even when there is no King Wen around.17
Proper conduct is “second nature” to gentlemen, or rather, the sprouts 
that were latent in their first and only nature are fully grown. On 
the scale of sophistication, they inhabit the positive end. It would be 
inconceivable for such a person, after a long process of careful self-
cultivation, to suddenly slump to the negative end of the scale. Yet that 
is exactly what happened to Feng Fu.
As a gentleman on an outing to the countryside, he encountered 
frightened villagers who were unable to subjugate the sharp-clawed 
creature he was formerly trained to fight. Feng Fu now faced a 
dilemma (cf. Wang 2002, 63). If he rejected their appeal for help, he 
would show callous disregard for their distress. This would make 
him inhuman: not humane and barely even human. In one word, he 
would be a beast (Mencius 4A.17 brands such people as “jackals and 
wolves” 豺狼, as discussed below). However, if he heeded their plea, 
the ensuing hand-to-paw combat would rekindle his primal instincts 
and essentially reduce him to an animal as well.
Feng Fu may not have been aware of the dilemma. For him, help-
ing others while at the same time enjoying his former profession 
16 Mencius 2A.2: 宋人有閔其苗之不長而揠之者. 芒芒然歸, 謂其人曰 “今日病矣! 予助苗長矣.” 其子趨而往	
視之, 苗則槁矣. 
17 Mencius 7A.10: 待文王而後興者凡民也, 若夫豪傑之士雖無文王猶興.
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meant putting his old skills to good use—a win-win situation for the 
villagers and for himself. This explains his instantaneous reaction. 
The locals had only just welcomed him when he “immediately bared 
his arms, and descended from the carriage.”18 On the spur of the 
moment, Feng Fu must have forgotten that the demeanor of a tiger 
fighter is incompatible with that of a gentleman.
The other gentlemen were not that forgetful. When they learned 
how easily Feng Fu fell into his old and ungentlemanly habits, they 
snorted with laughter. As a gentleman, Feng Fu must have under gone 
the long moral training that made them into sophisti cated men who 
control their animal instincts. Yet as soon as the opportunity arose 
he charged at a tiger again. Myeong-Seok Kim calls this “emotional 
backsliding,” which is when “a person of some degree of moral 
cultivation falls back to succumb to his old temptation and do what 
is not morally desirable” (2014, 67). This retrogression shows that 
Feng Fu had not managed to shake off his old animalistic self. His 
re fine ment turned out to be no more than a thin layer of varnish. 
With his descent from the carriage to fight the tiger, he effectively ex-
communicated himself, unbecoming as it is for a gentleman to “engage 
in feats of such foolhardiness,” as Dobson puts it (1963, 51).19
Now that we know why the gentlemen in the anecdote laughed 
at Feng Fu, how does the narrator, Mencius, judge their laughter? 
He ends the anecdote rather abruptly with a remark in which he 
presents two diametrically opposed responses to Feng Fu’s descent: 
approval by the crowd (“pleased with him”) versus disapproval by 
the gentlemen (“laughed at him”). He does not express a preference 
for either response, leaving it to readers to assess them.
Given the overwhelmingly positive portrayal of shi throughout 
the Mencius, and the text’s suggestion that Mencius belonged to their 
group, as discussed in the previous section of this article, readers 
may reasonably assume that he would side with the gentlemen in 
18 As translated by Legge ([1861] 1991, 488), who added the word in italics to highlight 
the immediacy of the action.
19 For similar remarks, see Legge ([1861] 1991, 489), Faber (1882, 121), LaFargue (1994, 
90), and Van Norden (2008, 189).
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disapproving of Feng Fu’s behavior in the countryside. However, this 
assumption may be challenged by a similar ethical dilemma else-
where in the text, which revolves around the question whether a 
man may lend a helping hand to a drowning woman if it violates the 
moral rule that prevents physical contact between (unmarried) men 
and women (Mencius 4A.17). In response to that dilemma, Mencius 
pulls an ideal tool from his philosophical toolbox: quan 權, variously 
translated as “weighing circumstances,” “moral discretion,” etc. 
In her in-depth analysis of quan, Griet Vankeerberghen (2005, 74) 
remarks that “moral or ritual rules are never absolute, and that the 
agent, occasionally, may face the necessity of breaking them,” because 
“a failure to break the rules would have extreme and unpleasant 
consequences.” Wielding quan enables Mencius to declare that a 
man is exceptionally allowed, and even morally obliged, to extend 
his hand when a woman is at risk of being swallowed by water. By 
parallel, he may hold that Feng Fu was morally obliged to bare his 
arms when villagers were at risk of being clawed by a tiger. Hence, 
readers could reasonably assume that he would side with the crowd 
in approving of Feng Fu’s behavior in the countryside.
If readers can muster arguments and evidence for either view, 
why did Mencius not follow the anecdote with his final judgment of 
Feng Fu. We could conveniently argue that the text is corrupt, and 
that the judgment was somehow omitted from Mencius’s statement 
in the course of the text’s transmission. However, note that the 
statement is not only open-ended, but also open-started. When told 
that the starving population of Qi hopes that he will plead once again 
with their king to open the state granary, Mencius does not provide a 
straightforward answer, whether affirmative or negative, but merely 
states that it “would be to act like Feng Fu,” which can be interpreted 
either way. Hence, it seems that the text is not necessarily corrupt, 
and that the ambiguity is deliberate. The underlying reasons may 
become clearer when we take a closer look at the frame narrative 
that contains the anecdote.
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V. Repetition
The anecdote involving the tiger is a story within a story involving 
famine. When the Mencius character in the outer story speaks of 
acting like the Feng Fu character in the inner story, he draws a parallel 
between himself and the tiger catcher. This suggests that their situa-
tions are analogous. How, exactly, does the analogy work? This 
question is important, because the answer affects our understanding 
of the meaning of the passage as a whole.
One interpretation of the analogy is expressed most elaborately by 
Cui Aofei (2012, 40–41). In this interpretation, the tiger corresponds to 
the ruler, and catching the tiger to persuading the ruler.
Table 1. Target-Action Scenario
Protagonist Target Action
Feng Fu tiger catching the tiger
Mencius ruler persuading the ruler
There are several problems with this scenario. For starters, the ruler 
is not mentioned in the outer story, which renders a correspondence 
with the tiger in the inner story unlikely. Furthermore, in this inter-
pretation the main message of the nested narrative would be that 
persuading a ruler is as dangerous as catching a tiger, and that just 
like Feng Fu may fail to catch the tiger, Mencius may fail to persuade 
the ruler. Indeed, several scholars apparently consider this to be the 
main takeaway from the passage, for they also think that Mencius 
expects another plea to be futile. For instance, Bloom notes that 
“Mencius evidently believed that his second request would be 
rejected” (2009, 161).20 In my view, this reading may not be altogether 
plausible for two reasons.
Firstly, Feng Fu is introduced as a skillful tiger catcher, and no where 
20 For similar remarks, see Faber (1882, 121) and Eno (2016, 156).
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does the text hint that he may lose. We may therefore reasonably 
assume that Feng Fu “presumably dealt with the tiger, though the text 
does not say so” (Dobson 1963, 51). One could, of course, argue that 
his skills had faded over time, or that even the best fighters at some 
point lose. However, in that case the main message of the passage 
would be a bland “quit while you’re ahead,” which is hardly the kind 
of advice one would expect from Mencius.
Secondly, nowhere does the text suggest that Mencius believes 
his request would be in vain. Even if that were the case, the main 
message would be a bleak “do the right thing, except when you think 
you may fail.” Mencius would not want to be associated with this 
defeatist outlook, which clashes with his aforementioned view that a 
shi does what is right, even if it would kill him.
My interpretation of the analogy is different. In my view, the tiger 
corresponds to the famine (both are problems), and catching the 
tiger to distributing grain (both are solutions).
Table 2. Problem-Solution Scenario
Protagonist Problem Solution
Feng Fu tiger catching the tiger
Mencius famine distributing grain
Both Feng Fu and Mencius faced a problem. For the former, it was a 
stray tiger that threatened locals in a rural area; for the latter, a famine 
that starved the inhabitants of a state. The two men did not cause 
these problems, but they were called upon to offer solutions: Feng Fu 
by the locals; Mencius by the people of Qi. Both men were hailed as 
potential saviors on account of previous successes in their respective 
fields: Feng Fu in catching tigers, Mencius in persuading rulers. In all 
these ways their situations are analogous, but the analogy falls short 
in two regards.
(1) As a former tiger catcher, Feng Fu has the ability to attack the 
problem directly, but Mencius lacks the authority to issue grain. He 
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can only address the problem indirectly, by imploring the authorities 
to do so. This has important implications, as we shall soon see.
(2) Fighting the tiger makes Feng Fu revert to his animalistic self, 
which from a shi perspective is inherently wrong, but asking the ruler 
to open the granary does not make Mencius an animal. Hence, the 
analogy he sees between the tiger catcher and himself is not in what 
they do, but in repeating what they do. Feng Fu is asked to fight again; 
Mencius to plead again. From a shi perspective, pleading for the 
distribution of grain is not inherently wrong, but repeating it is (cf. S. 
Kim 2010, 37–38).
To understand the problem of repetition, we may start by looking 
at Mencius’s views on rulership. He maintains that the responsibility 
for order in a state lies with the person in charge. Order requires 
sensible governance, including agricultural policies that account for 
the possibility of a failed harvest so as to guarantee the continued 
nutrition of the populace. Famine, a manifest aberration of the 
orderly state, denotes failure of governance. Mencius leaves no doubt 
about who is to blame, when he tells a head of state:
When people starve to death and you say, “it wasn’t me, it was the 
harvest,” how does this differ from stabbing someone to death and 
saying, “it wasn’t me, it was the knife”?21
During a previous famine in Qi, which Chen Zhen hints at in the 
frame narrative, Mencius had apparently implored the ruler to issue 
grain, as an expedient measure for the emaciated and, presumably, 
as a warning for the ruler to improve his agricultural policies. That 
Qi now faces famine anew suggests that the warning has not been 
heeded, at least not adequately. “Considering the recurrence of the 
same problem,” Sungmoon Kim notes, “the famine was indeed man-
made, which makes it a social problem affiliated with the failure of 
the local government’s public policy” (2010, 37–38). Failed policy not 
only caused the famine, but also exacerbated the hunger, because 
while people are starving again, the king had “apparently decided it 
21 Mencius 1A.3: 人死則曰 “非我也, 歲也” 是何異於刺人而殺之, 曰 “非我也, 兵也.” 
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is not yet time to dip into the grain the state has stored up for such 
occasions” (LaFargue 1994, 98), even though Mencius’s previous 
plea had suggested this to be the proper course of action. Naturally, 
Mencius could repeat his plea to open the granary. However, as I 
mentioned earlier, he holds gentlemen who offer admonishments in 
high esteem. In this case, not repeating his request could be construed 
as an admonition through silence, for it gives the king a nonverbal 
schooling in who is responsible for the problem and its solution.
Mencius’s theory of political responsibility explains the merit of 
not repeating the plea, but not the harm of repeating it. Chen Zhen 
seems to have the latter in mind when he tells Mencius “I apprehend 
you cannot do so again.” This forces us to find a stronger explanation 
of why repetition would be wrong. As I have shown, when a shi 
offers advice to a ruler who fails to appreciate it, his talents are wasted 
and he should seek employ elsewhere. Suppose, hypothetically, that 
Mencius repeated his request. He would thereby acquiesce in the 
paucity of action following his earlier imploration, and implicitly 
admit that his advice need not be heeded, which weakens his cre-
dibility as an advisor. As Bloom (2009, 161) notes, “Mencius evidently 
believed that [. . .] he would lose a measure of credibility, as did Feng 
Fu when he reverted to an earlier role of tiger tamer.” More generally 
it diminishes the gravity of the role of advisor, which may explain 
why he expects to be derided by other shi if he were to act as Feng 
Fu. He would betray their dignity and no longer deserve to be in 
their midst. That, in my view, is why Mencius carefully ponders the 
consequences and presumably declines to repeat his plea for grain, 
though the text does not explicitly say so.
This raises the question of why shi identity is so important to 
Mencius. In the anecdote about the tiger, the villagers welcome Feng 
Fu to lend them a helping hand, and in the frame narrative about 
the famine, the inhabitants of Qi want Mencius to help them as 
well. If a helpful action pleases the multitudes, why would it matter 
that it displeases the relatively small group of shi? Feng Fu seems 
unbothered by this, for he charges at the tiger anyway, but Mencius is 
more cautious. I suspect that this is related to the opportunities of shi 
to do good. As a tiger catcher, Feng Fu can help only one village at a 
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time, but as an advisor to a head of state he would be able to enhance 
people’s livelihood on a much larger scale. Sadly, he squandered this 
opportunity with his ungentlemanly behavior in the countryside. 
Unlike Feng Fu, Mencius seems fully aware that he faces a devilish 
dilemma:
• If he repeats his plea for the distribution of grain, he would help 
the ill-fed now, but diminish his credibility and his standing as a 
shi, and thereby limit his chances of offering similar help in the 
future.
• If he does not repeat his plea for the distribution of grain, he 
would leave the ill-fed to their fate, but retain his credibility and 
his standing as a shi, and thereby maintain his chances of offering 
similar help in the future.
This ethical dilemma is a real quandary over choosing between actual 
help-seekers in the present, and an unknown number of potential 
help-seekers in the future. If I am right in assuming that Mencius opts 
to not act like Feng Fu, he leaves the victims of this one famine to 
their fate, which his theory of political responsibility enables him to 
do, in hopes of aiding victims of disasters to come. While there is no 
good answer to the dilemma, as people die either way, Mencius seems 
to opt for the largest possible reach of his talents, which he expects to 
find in the future.
One might ask, as I did earlier, why Mencius does not apply quan 
here. After all, since he asserts that the perils of drowning override 
objections to physical contact between unmarried men and women, 
he could similarly argue that the perils of starving override objections 
to repeating a plea. However, this may be approaching it from the 
wrong angle, because what if Mencius actually did consider quan, 
and concluded that the situation did not warrant an exception? To 
explore this a little further, it may be worth quoting the passage on 
the drowning woman in full:
Chunyu Kun asked, “Does ritual propriety entail that, in giving and 
receiving, men and women must not touch one another?” “It does,” 
said Mencius. “If your sister-in-law were drowning, would you 
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rescue her with your hand?” Mencius replied, “Only a beast would 
not rescue a drowning sister-in-law. While ritual propriety entails 
that in giving and receiving men and women must not touch one 
another, rescuing a drowning sister-in-law with a hand is a matter 
of expedience [quan].” “Then why is it that you do not come to the 
rescue now that the whole world is drowning?” Mencius replied, 
“When the world is drowning, you rescue it with the Way. When a 
sister-in-law is drowning, you rescue her with your hand. Do you 
wish me to rescue the world with my hand?”22
The first part of this passage is often invoked in discussions of quan, 
for it illustrates the view that the moral agent may occasionally face 
the necessity of breaking moral or ritual rules. The latter part of the 
passage is less popular, but no less important. After Mencius asserts 
that extending a hand to rescue a woman is a matter of expedience, 
his contemporary Chunyu Kun, the quick-tongued courtier from the 
state of Qi, asks why Mencius would not lend a helping hand to rescue 
the world. Mencius thereupon draws a distinction between the means 
to rescue one person and the means to rescue the whole world. He 
ends with a rhetorical question that perplexes scholars. For example, 
Legge notes “I hardly see the point of the last question” ([1861] 1991, 
308), and Lau suggests that “Mencius’ final question seems totally 
irrelevant” (1963, 180). In my view, the rhetorical question serves two 
purposes, namely (a) to ridicule Chunyu Kun, by pretending to take 
literally the phrase “the whole world is drowning,” which the courtier 
clearly meant figuratively, and (b) to make the important point that 
expedience does not apply when rescuing the world.
In his in-depth analysis of this passage, D.C. Lau distinguishes 
between instrumental and constitutive means to achieve goals (1963, 
180). The hand is an instrumental means to rescue someone from 
drowning; it is one of several possible means (one could also use a 
stick); and it is morally neutral (a hand can be used for good or bad 
ends). The Way is a constitutive means to rescue a world in disorder. 
22 Mencius 4A.17: 淳于髡曰 “男女授受不親, 禮與？” 孟子曰 “禮也.” 曰 "嫂溺則援之以手乎？” 曰 “嫂溺不援, 
是豺狼也. 男女授受不親, 禮也; 嫂溺援之以手者, 權也.” 曰 “今天下溺矣, 夫子之不援, 何也？” 曰 “天下溺, 	
援之以道; 嫂溺, 援之以手. 子欲手援天下乎？”
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When rescued, the world is said to “have the Way” 有道, which sug-
gests a strong bond between means and end. The Way is not morally 
neutral, because immoral usage equals “lacking the Way” 無道. Unlike 
moral or ritual rules, which in exceptional circumstances may be 
broken, the Way may never be compromised. When Chunyu Kun 
suggests that Mencius should treat saving the world as a matter of 
expedience (quan), he “did not realize that the price for such a com-
promise was so high as to defeat its very purpose” (Lau 1963, 184).
This brings us back to the tiger and the famine. It seems that in 
both cases, quan does not apply, because being a shi is a constitutive 
means to achieve goals. It is not a ritual prohibition that can be 
broken as a matter of expedience, but a lifestyle of the highest moral 
caliber that cannot be compromised, because even a single exception 
—fighting one tiger or repeating one plea—would defeat its very pur-
pose. It would strip the moral agent of his gentlemanliness, his raison 
d’être.
In summary, when it comes to ethical dilemmas, Mencius seems 
to uphold a hierarchy. If a situation exceptionally calls for breaking 
a specific moral or ritual rule, this is allowable when observing the 
rule would yield worse consequences than violating it. However, 
if the situation affects the sum total of all rules (the Way), or the 
integrity of the moral agent (the shi) who embodies it, exceptions do 
not apply.
VI. Conclusion
In his article “Casuistry and Character in the Mencius,” Robert Eno 
draws attention to casuistic passages in the text. Such passages pro-
vide instances of how exemplary people—first and foremost, Mencius 
himself—respond to morally difficult situations. Exploring the case-
specific responses enables readers to gain access to the authoritative 
morality of these sages. As Eno puts it, casuistic passages invite 
readers “to engage in a hermeneutic of personal exploration, ap-
proaching through imaginative acts of verstehen [understanding] 
the perspective of the authoritative sage” (2002, 189–190). The 
40  Volume 35/Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture
methodology of verstehen, which he defines as “an empathetic grasp 
of virtue perspectives cultivated through hermeneutic probing 
of historical narratives,” can be challenging, especially when the 
narrative is unclear. The present article has attempted to understand 
the abstruse passage involving the reappearance of famine in Qi. If 
Mencius serves as an exemplary figure in the text, as Eno suggests, 
what are readers to learn from his response to this morally difficult 
situation? In my view, there are several take-aways from this passage, 
both methodological and philosophical.
While casuistic passages present specific cases of morally difficult 
situations, reading them in isolation would be unwise. The passages 
are embedded in a textual and cultural context, which may be helpful 
in understanding their full import. In this particular case it proved 
helpful to glance at other Mencius passages featuring Chen Zhen, as 
they tend to address the integrity of political advisors, a main concern 
in this passage as well. Similarly, other ancient writings illustrated the 
prevalence of tiger fighting, and the distaste for the practice by some 
scholars, particularly those of a Confucian persuasion. Finally, to 
understand the pivotal concept in this passage, shi, it proved vital to 
analyze portrayals of these men elsewhere in the Mencius.
This passage teaches readers that the shi-ideal, the perfect em-
bodiment of the Confucian way, is sacrosanct to Mencius. The ideal 
cannot be abandoned, even in situations of dire need, and exceptions 
of moral discretion (quan) do not apply. Mencius views shi as people 
of the highest moral caliber, who care deeply for the wellbeing 
of others. They strive for the largest possible reach of their care, 
by improving the living standards of the people though guidance 
of those in power. They accept the sovereign’s authority, but not 
unconditionally, for they possess the wisdom and the courage to 
speak truth to power. In return they expect recognition, which entails 
that their advice is taken up. If recognition is not forthcoming, this 
violates their credibility and dignity, and forces them to look for rulers 
who do appreciate their insights, even if this means, as it seems to do 
here, that they must leave the emaciated to their fate. By opting to 
not address the life-threatening tribulations of the population of Qi, 
Mencius is making the point that for a shi something more important 
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is at stake: his principles. To him, these outweigh everything, even 
life. Mencius is willing to give up life, his own or that of others, to 
prevent the dilution of principles. After all, he who bends himself can 
no longer straighten others.
This passage also teaches readers that the shi-ideal represents a 
reflective frame of mind. It portrays Feng Fu as a rash character who 
acts, seemingly without thinking, based on his primary impulses. 
By contrast, the text reveals how Mencius, as a moral exemplar, 
responds to a similar situation, that is, with thought and restraint. 
He resembles the kind of military commander that was admired 
by Confucius. Strength and courage may be important qualities in 
battle, but impulsively charging at an opponent, whether human or 
feline, creates unnecessary exposure to risk. Wise commanders, and 
shi, make decisions only after careful contemplation.
Finally, the passage suggests that a reflective mind expresses itself 
through measured speech. Morally difficult situations involve painful 
choices. In this particular case, the choice is between, on the one hand, 
helping people now while losing one’s credibility as a shi and, on the 
other hand, maintaining one’s credibility as a shi while hoping to help 
people in the future. If my reading of the passage is correct, Mencius 
opts for the latter. It must be painful for him to turn a deaf ear to the 
cries of hunger coming from Qi, which may explain why he does not 
offer a straightforward answer to Chen Zhen’s question, and responds 
with an allusive anecdote about a tiger catcher instead.23 If he had 
made his choice explicit, he would have shown the people of Qi that 
he abandoned them, which someone who maintains that humans 
have “a heart that does not remain indifferent to others” 不忍人之
心 simply could not do (Mencius 2A.6). Moreover, by not expressing 
his choice, Mencius forces readers to ponder the problem with him, 
thereby enabling them to come to their own verstehen of the course of 
action preferred by moral exemplars.
■  Submitted: 27 January 2020, Reviewed/revised: 28 April 2020, Accepted: 29 April 2020
23 Wilhelm calls this redend schweigen ([1916] 1921, 177n21), which implies that Mencius 
remains silent on a certain topic, deliberately avoiding addressing it, while still talking.
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